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Abstract
We study the aggregate gap between intended and actual fertility in 19 European 
countries and the US based on a cohort approach. This complements prior research 
that had mainly used a period approach. We compare the mean intended number 
of children among young women aged 20 to 24  (born in the early 1970s), meas-
ured during the 1990s in the Fertility and Family Surveys, with data on completed 
fertility in the same cohorts around age 40. In a similar manner, we compare the 
share who state that they do not want a child with actual cohort childlessness. Our 
exploration is informed by the cognitive–social model of fertility intentions devel-
oped by Bachrach and Morgan (Popul Dev Rev 39(3):459–485, 2013). In all coun-
tries, women eventually had, on average, fewer children than the earlier expectations 
in their birth cohort, and more often than intended, they remained childless. The 
results reveal distinct regional patterns, which are most apparent for childlessness. 
The gap between intended and actual childlessness is widest in the Southern Euro-
pean and the German-speaking countries and smallest in the Central and Eastern 
European countries. Additionally, we analyze the aggregate intentions-fertility gap 
among women with different levels of education. The gap is largest among highly 
educated women in most countries studied and the educational gradient varies by 
region, most distinctively for childlessness. Differences between countries suggest 
that contextual factors—norms about parenthood, work–family policies, unemploy-
ment—shape women’s fertility goals, total family size, and the gap between them.
Keywords Childlessness · Education · Europe · Family size · Fertility intentions · 
United States
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Introduction
While fertility rates are generally low in Europe, fertility intentions remain close to 
replacement level. In 2011, across the 27 countries of the European Union, women 
in young adulthood (age 15 to 24) intended to have, on average, 2.1 children (Testa 
2012). This suggests that couples frequently have fewer children than they intended 
to have, resulting in an aggregate gap between intentions and behavior (see e.g., 
Harknett and Hartnett 2014). This notion of a “fertility gap” has been picked up by 
policy makers who have, as a consequence, formulated the aim to enable couples to 
have the number of children they intend to have (Philipov 2009). It entered policy 
debates and official policy documents of the European Commission in the 1990s and 
2000s, and became one of the main justifications for family policies. In the scholarly 
literature, the “fertility gap” is typically measured by comparing stated lifetime fam-
ily size ideals or intentions with period indicators of fertility in the recent past, such 
as the total fertility rate (Adserà 2006; Bongaarts 2008; Lutz 2007; Sobotka and 
Lutz 2010; Testa 2012). These comparisons do not, however, reflect early lifetime 
intentions and total family size of one and the same birth cohort of women and, as a 
result, the messages arising from them can be misleading (Sobotka and Lutz 2010).
Our current study adds to the research on the fertility gap by analyzing the gap 
between aggregate fertility intentions in early adulthood and ultimate completed fer-
tility within a birth cohort of women. Recommended by Sobotka and Lutz (2010), 
the cohort approach is internally more consistent and methodologically more rigor-
ous than approaches taken by most previous studies, which compare lifetime and 
period measures. Moreover, our study is the first to systematically measure the gap 
across many countries along cohort lines. Single country studies have provided 
detailed analyses, but their results cannot be directly compared because they con-
sidered different cohorts, measured fertility intentions at different ages, and relied 
on different intention measures (Berrington and Pattaro 2014; Morgan and Rackin 
2010; Smallwood and Jefferies 2003). Our paper takes another step forward with 
respect to these earlier works by applying a uniform research design for studying a 
large number of countries.
In this study, we specifically estimate two gaps for women born (mainly) in the 
early 1970s for 19 European countries and the US. First, we estimate the difference 
between mean intended family size in young adulthood (age 20 to 24) and cohort 
total fertility rate; the “fertility gap” obtained is the mean number of children the 
cohort falls short of. Second, the equivalent difference between intended and even-
tual cohort childlessness is denoted as “excess childlessness.”1 We also analyze the 
gaps by education for a subset of 11 countries in order to explore which groups in 
society under-achieve their fertility intentions from an aggregate perspective (Ber-
rington and Pattaro 2014). For the education-specific analyses, we study fertility 
1 We use the term “childlessness” because it is well-established in the research literature. It has been 
critically discussed because its meaning (“without a child”) implies a norm of having children. The alter-
native “childfree” implies a choice, which is not always the case, so we opted for the usual wording.
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intentions of 25- to 29-year-old women, because most of them have completed their 
education by this age.
The framework of our study relies on the cognitive–social model of fertility inten-
tions developed by Bachrach and Morgan (2013), which addresses the predictive 
value of intentions reported early in life for fertility at the (cohort) aggregate level. It 
is also informed by Bongaarts’ (2001) investigation of the factors possibly enhancing 
and reducing the period fertility gap. The cognitive–social model of fertility inten-
tions posits that the lifetime fertility intentions reported during young adulthood 
tend to be more influenced by cultural models and schemas of the family that are 
established during childhood and adolescence—which involve little commitment to 
act—than by specific experiences and actual circumstances (Bachrach and Morgan 
2013). This contrasts with short-term intentions, which take into account the spe-
cific life circumstances (Billari et al. 2009; Dommermuth et al. 2011; Iacovou and 
Tavares 2011; Spéder and Kapitány 2009; Testa 2014; Testa et al. 2014). Despite a 
high degree of uncertainty and low individual predictive validity (Ní Bhrolcháin and 
Beaujouan 2011), aggregate lifetime intentions are on average better predictors of 
fertility than individual-level intentions, because over- and under-achievement tend 
to balance each other out, as research on the US has shown (Edmonston et al. 2010; 
Morgan and Rackin 2010). As to fertility outcomes, the cognitive–social model pos-
its that they are predominantly influenced by the institutional and cultural context, 
fertility intentions themselves, as well as by competing factors in other life domains, 
most importantly education, employment, relationships, and leisure (Bachrach and 
Morgan 2013; Bongaarts 2001). Our cross-national approach allows us to discuss 
the importance of structural and cultural conditions on the country level in shaping 
fertility intentions, actual fertility, and the gap between them.
The Gap Between Lifetime Intentions and Final Parity
Conceptual Framework
When examining the cohort fertility gap, lifetime intentions and actual fertility 
need to be studied and understood independently because they are influenced by 
different processes and determinants. According to Bachrach and Morgan’s cogni-
tive–social model of fertility intentions (2013), during childhood in the family of 
origin, persons develop schemas—such as the concept of a family—which get con-
nected with sensations and feelings. In adolescence, these schemas are then related 
to the perception of oneself and oneself-to-be. When children relate to positive feel-
ings, the formation of positive fertility intentions later in life becomes more likely. 
Intentions are commonly conceived as behavioral goals corresponding to specific 
circumstances and involving a clear commitment to act. As Miller has stated, “inten-
tions involve a specific decision to pursue an actionable goal, with an associated 
commitment and, commonly, a plan for implementing the decision” (Miller 2011, p. 
78). Lifetime intentions reported by young adults, by contrast, are often uncertain, 
tentative, and volatile (Iacovou and Tavares 2011). This uncertainty is reinforced 
because the common preconditions for having a child—having a steady partner, 
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completing education, acquiring a stable job, and accumulating resources such as 
income or housing—are often not fulfilled (Ní Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan 2011). 
This has implications for the interpretation of young adults’ intentions stated in 
surveys. Bachrach and Morgan have argued that: “In some cases, the answers may 
reflect intentions; in other cases, they may reflect scripts or cultural models imbued 
with positive affect and integrated into self-schemas […]; in yet others, answers may 
simply reflect basic prototypes of a family—a mother, father, and two children, for 
example—perhaps associated with positive affect but not deeply integrated into a 
schema of a future self” (Bachrach and Morgan 2013, p. 470). The authors call these 
answers ‘reported intentions’ in contrast to ‘actual intentions.’ This distinction is 
important for interpreting the lifetime fertility intentions and the resulting gap to 
total number of children. Smallwood and Jefferies have posited that the fertility gap 
“should not necessarily be interpreted as an unmet need for fertility. The disparity is 
as likely to be a result of the uncertain nature of many women’s intentions and the 
tendency of intentions to be modified according to circumstances” (Smallwood and 
Jefferies 2003, p. 24). When they address the relationship between fertility inten-
tions and behavior at the aggregate level, Bachrach and Morgan (2013) shift their 
focus from cognitive processes to structural conditions based on Bongaarts’ model 
(2001). They argue that “[b]ecause fertility intentions may be rooted in deeply val-
ued, long-standing schemas about the family, whereas their implementation neces-
sarily depends on contemporary structural conditions, there is much room for aggre-
gate-level intentions and fertility to diverge during a cohort’s reproductive years” (p. 
479). The degree to which they diverge varies across countries and is dependent on 
the mix of the different factors proposed by Bongaarts in the period perspective. The 
factors that reduce fertility are competing goals (with regard to education, employ-
ment, and leisure), adverse circumstances (such as unemployment), infecundity, and 
fertility postponement. On the other hand, fertility will be enhanced by unwanted 
births (dependent on contraception and abortion), replacement of deceased chil-
dren, and sex preferences. In contemporary developed societies, we consider that 
infecundity as well as sex preferences and replacement of deceased children will act 
at about the same level in all countries, which allows to disregard them in our com-
parison. Given our cohort approach, we also disregard fertility postponement, which 
Bongaarts discusses in view of distortions in the total fertility rate. In our compara-
tive cohort framework, competing goals and adverse circumstances thus remain the 
main factors potentially reducing fertility, and unwanted births enhancing it.
Previous Empirical Studies
Empirical evidence on the cohort fertility gap is rather limited. The predictive value 
of aggregate intentions reported early on in adult life for final parity has been inves-
tigated in single country studies for the US (Freedman et  al. 1980; Morgan and 
Rackin 2010), the UK (Berrington and Pattaro 2014; Smallwood and Jefferies 2003) 
and Norway (Noack and Ostby 2002). Those studies have found a gap of around 
0.2–0.3 children per woman between intended and actual numbers of children 
for cohorts born in the mid-1950s to the early 1960s. In the US, the gap between 
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intentions at age 24 and completed fertility amounted to 0.25 births per woman 
(difference between 2.22 and 1.97; birth cohorts 1957–1964) (Morgan and Rackin 
2010).2 In the UK, a gap of 0.2–0.3 births per woman was reported between stated 
intentions at ages 21 to 23 and final parity (mean intended family size of 2.25; birth 
cohorts 1957–1959) (Smallwood and Jefferies 2003). In Norway, women aged 20 to 
24 (cohorts 1953–1957) intended to have on average 2.4 children but had reached 
2.1 children by their 40s (Noack and Ostby 2002).
Relating period to cohort measures, Sobotka and Lutz (2010) have provided 
evidence on the size of the fertility gap based on the intended number of children 
and the tempo-adjusted total fertility rate for different regions of Europe. They 
showed an average gap of 0.34 children per woman for EU-27 with the minimum 
gap observed in Germany and Austria (0.25) and the maximum gaps in Central and 
Eastern European countries (0.44) and Northern Europe (0.41). They found moder-
ate gaps for Western and Southern Europe.
A small number of studies also investigated how lifetime intentions and their real-
ization differed by educational attainment; they reported that the gap grows with 
education (e.g., Berrington and Pattaro 2014). Indeed, even though there is no con-
sistent link between intentions articulated in early adulthood and educational level 
(Berrington and Pattaro 2014; Sobotka 2009; Testa 2014), highly educated women 
tend to reach a smaller completed family size than their lower educated counter-
parts with variations by welfare regime (Merz and Liefbroer 2017; Neyer and Hoem 
2008). In the US, the overachievement (i.e., having more children than intended) of 
women with a lower level of education was partly attributed to unintended child-
bearing (Morgan and Rackin 2010; Quesnel-Vallée and Morgan 2003).
Country‑Specific Expectations
The comparative design of our study allows us to explore why the fertility gap var-
ies across countries. Based on our conceptual framework, with respect to fertility 
intentions, we focus on the size of the family of origin to refer to cultural norms and 
norms within families. With respect to the actual number of children, we focus on 
employment conditions and work–family compatibility3 (to represent unanticipated 
circumstances and competing goals) as well as on contraceptive use and abortion (as 
correlates of unplanned births) (see Table 1).
2 An earlier study on the US showed that the gap was 1.0 child for women who were first interviewed in 
1962 in early adulthood (difference between 3.67 and 2.67 children) (Freedman et al. 1980).
3 In the frame of this paper, we do not consider leisure, studies, and relationships, although they are 
structural elements that influence the actual number of children (Bachrach and Morgan 2013). We 
assume that the chance of entering a partnership is similar across the countries under study. Separation 
rates differ by country, which may affect completed fertility because women who separate have, on aver-
age, less children than the others (Van Bavel et al. 2012). At least, among women the effect of separation 
on completed fertility itself varies very little by country. Leisure and studies are relevant as competing 
goals, but arguably less so than employment and we assume few systematic differences between coun-
tries.
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The fertility rate of earlier cohorts may be taken as a proxy for prevailing cultural 
childbearing norms during childhood and adolescence. We thus use the fertility level 
of cohorts born in 1950–1954, i.e., around 15 years earlier, to represent family struc-
ture while growing up. Where previous cohorts had higher numbers of children, 
cultural norms of large families prevail (Testa and Grilli 2006), and if people expe-
rienced growing up with many siblings, their fertility intentions tend to be higher 
too (Axinn et al. 1994; Kotte and Ludwig 2011; Régnier-Loilier 2006). Therefore, 
in countries with a strong decline of fertility over cohorts, a marked gap between 
reported intentions and behavior is likely to arise. The fertility decline was most pro-
nounced in the Southern European countries (Greece, Spain, Italy, and Portugal) as 
well as in Bulgaria (see Table 1). Compared to Southern Europe, the drop in fertility 
rates in the late-1960s and early 1970s cohorts was generally smaller in the Central 
and Eastern European countries (Frejka and Calot 2001). With regard to childless-
ness intentions, we refer to the prevalent social norms (see Table 1). Indeed, previ-
ous studies revealed a clear East–West divide in the cultural acceptance of childless-
ness, with Eastern European populations clearly opposing childlessness (Merz and 
Liefbroer 2012).
We examine three explanations for variations in the actual number of children: 
economic situation, work–family combination, and unplanned births. Past stud-
ies confirmed that economic conditions are central for men’s and women’s fertil-
ity behaviors. A negative correlation between the unemployment rate and the total 
fertility rate has been documented (D’Addio and Mira d’Ercole 2005) and individ-
ual-level research showed that unemployment may lead couples to delay or forgo 
childbearing (Adserà 2011; Kreyenfeld and Andersson 2014). In 1995–2004, West-
ern Europe and the US were least affected by unemployment, although the unem-
ployment levels were substantial in France, Belgium, and Germany (see Table 1). 
The unemployment rate was particularly high in some Southern European countries 
(notably in Spain and Italy) and in most of the East, particularly in Bulgaria and the 
Baltic states, which was linked to a post-1989 economic depression.
Second, work–family compatibility is another important factor affecting fertility 
levels. There are several possible indicators to measure the conditions of work–fam-
ily reconciliation. In terms of family policies, childcare services and childcare leaves 
are two key instruments (Matysiak and Węziak-Białowolska 2016), and we focus 
here on childcare services.4 In addition, we present the employment rate of moth-
ers with children below age 15 as a measure of the outcome of work–family condi-
tions (Table 1). Well-paid parental leave of moderate length and a well-developed 
childcare infrastructure strengthen women’s ties to the labor market (Dearing 2016) 
and are related to higher fertility rates (Luci-Greulich and Thévenon 2013). There 
is also a positive correlation between the female labor force participation rate and 
4 We have opted to present indicators related to childcare services, which are well comparable across 
countries, while the details of childcare leaves (availability, duration, financial compensation) are fre-
quently complex. We first include the enrolment rate in formal childcare for children below the age of 
three. Childcare provision lowers the barriers of mothers to enter employment and encourages them to 
take a break of short to moderate length. Second, we include the average number of weekly hours in 
childcare for the same age group, which reflects whether mothers can work full-time or part-time.
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the fertility rate (Ahn and Mira 2002; Engelhardt et al. 2004). As shown in Table 1, 
mothers’ employment rates are particularly low in the Southern European coun-
tries (with the exception of Portugal), which are characterized by weak family 
support policies, e.g., low childcare participation and low availability of part-time 
work (Adserà 2004, 2005; Del Boca et al. 2009). Several Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries report low employment rates for mothers (especially Hungary) and 
often low enrolment rates for children below age three (the Czech Republic, Bul-
garia, and Hungary). In some of these countries—particularly in the Czech Repub-
lic and Hungary—mothers take rather long leaves after childbirth (OECD 2017). 
The Central and Eastern European countries are similar to the South of Europe in 
their labor market structures (full-time work, high unemployment), but have higher 
public spending on family benefits (OECD 2014). After the regime change (when 
the women were surveyed), there was a rapid and dynamic societal transformation 
which included labor market reforms, social benefits, and family policies (Frejka 
and Gietel-Basten 2016). In Germany and Austria, mothers’ labor force participa-
tion rates are comparatively high while childcare enrolment rates of children below 
age three are very low: mothers commonly take long employment breaks after the 
birth of a child and tend to return to the workplace on a part-time basis (Bergham-
mer 2014; Konietzka and Kreyenfeld 2010). Switzerland differs in that early child-
care enrolment is frequent, but kindergarten opening hours are very short. In the UK 
and The Netherlands, women tend to re-enter the labor market rather fast after the 
birth of a child, mostly on a part-time basis. In the other countries, including France, 
Belgium, the US, and the Nordic countries, childcare enrolment rates are high and 
women combine full-time employment with childrearing duties.
Third, we refer to the prevalence of unplanned births due to contraceptive fail-
ure and restricted access to abortion. A high prevalence of unplanned and unwanted 
births is expected to reduce the gap between intentions and realized fertility. While 
variation in the rate of contraceptive use was modest across countries in the 1990s 
(when the women in our sample were generally between 20 and 29 years old), there 
were major differences with regard to the reliability of the contraceptive methods 
used (Makay 2015). Couples in Western European countries and several more afflu-
ent countries of Central and Eastern Europe used highly effective means of con-
traception (pill, IUD, and condom), while less reliable methods (rhythm and coitus 
interruptus) were more widespread in less prosperous and more Catholic Central and 
Eastern European countries (see Table 1). Slovakia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria report 
the lowest use of effective contraception; in the first two countries, this is related 
to the Catholic Church’s opposition to artificial methods of contraception (Stloukal 
1999) and in Bulgaria to the high costs of access (Vassilev 1999). In Bulgaria and 
elsewhere across the Central and Eastern European region, the low prevalence and 
limited supply of effective contraception were partly compensated for by resorting 
to abortion; rates of legally induced abortion were overall much higher in the East 
than in the West of Europe (Table 1). In Italy and Greece, though contraception was 
used, effective contraception was used less frequently than in most other Western 
European countries.
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In conclusion, based on these dimensions, we formulate the following country- 
and region-specific expectations.
Southern Europe
We expect comparatively high fertility intentions, particularly in Spain and Portu-
gal, where the mean family sizes of the parents’ cohorts were among the largest in 
Europe. Large fertility gaps and excess childlessness are predicted for Italy, Spain, 
and Greece (but less so for Portugal where mothers’ employment rate is much 
higher) for reasons of difficult labor market conditions and low support for reconcil-
ing work and family life. The share of unplanned births could be higher in Italy and 
Greece where the use of reliable contraception is low.
Central and Eastern Europe
We observe two groups of countries: the less economically advanced in the 1990s, 
with a poor economic and labor market situation and low use of reliable contracep-
tion (Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Latvia); and more affluent countries with higher use 
of contraception (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Slovenia). Childcare 
services for small children are infrequently used in comparison with the West, but 
mothers’ labor market participation is at equivalent levels. Given that the drop in 
fertility since the respondent’s childhood was not steep in most countries and that 
unplanned births might play a role in several countries, we expect overall lower fer-
tility gaps than in the South or German-speaking countries. In addition, we antici-
pate particularly low childlessness intentions and actual childlessness (i.e., a small 
gap) across Central and Eastern Europe based on social norms disapproving of 
childlessness.
Western Europe and the United States
Based on economic circumstances, work–family policies, reliability of contracep-
tion, and modest downward trends in fertility, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Nor-
way, the UK, and the US are expected to display a moderate gap in both number 
of children and level of childlessness. Germany, Austria, and Switzerland are char-
acterized by weak support of work–family reconciliation, which is why we expect 
lower fertility, but at the same time lower intentions—given their long-term history 
of low fertility—and thus a moderate gap as well.
Education‑Specific Expectations
Our study also examines the variation in the fertility gap between women with differ-
ent levels of education between ages 25 and 29. Due to data constraints, we perform 
the education-specific analysis for a subset of 11 countries only: Southern Europe 
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(Italy, Spain), Western Europe (Austria, Germany, Belgium, the UK, The Nether-
lands, Norway, Switzerland) and the US, Central and Eastern Europe (Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary). Prior research found no clear education gradient in lifetime fertility 
intentions (Berrington and Pattaro 2014; Sobotka 2009; Testa 2014), so we base 
our expectations about the magnitude of the fertility gap by education on the differ-
entiated constraints to actual fertility by education. Besides possible differences in 
unplanned births, we consider education-specific labor market opportunities linked 
to the economic situation and opportunities for combining work and family.
The educational gradient in mothers’ employment rates is particularly large in 
Italy, Spain, Belgium, the US, and The Netherlands, while it is smallest in Norway 
and Switzerland (see Table 2). Unemployment rates differ most strongly by educa-
tion in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Germany, Belgium, and France, while they 
are most comparable in Norway, Switzerland, Austria, The Netherlands, and Italy. 
Poor support for combining work and family responsibilities tends to curtail fertility 
of highly educated women most strongly. Hence, we expect a smaller educational 
gradient in final parity in countries which support work–family reconciliation (see 
Table 1 for childcare indicators).
Based on these factors, we formulate the following expectations.
Southern Europe
Moderate variations by level of education in fertility gap and excess childlessness 
are expected in Italy and Spain, where, on the one hand, highly educated women 
participate in the labor market but receive limited support for work–family recon-
ciliation, and where, on the other hand, families with less education face high work 
insecurity (particularly in Spain). These mechanisms could curtail the number of 
children in both groups, although for different reasons.
Western Europe and the United States
Among these countries, we expect the smallest gap in fertility and childlessness in 
Norway, where labor market behavior and unemployment risks are the most similar 
across educational groups and work–family policies support mothers’ employment. 
Moreover, we expect that the fertility gap by education and the gradient in excess 
childlessness is more pronounced in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland compared 
to in Belgium and The Netherlands, because women participate in the labor mar-
ket but family policies are not geared towards the combination of work and fam-
ily. Given the strong educational differences in fertility in the UK and the US (Ber-
rington et al. 2015), which are predominantly driven by high teenage fertility and 
unplanned births among the less educated (Morgan and Rackin 2010; Musick et al. 
2009), we also expect women with lower levels of education to display a smaller 
fertility gap than their higher educated peers.
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Central and Eastern Europe
The Czech Republic is characterized by very high unemployment among the low-
educated and a rather high female labor force participation rate, although parental 
leave policies enacted in the early 1990s motivated mothers to stay home with their 
children. This country has generous universal social benefits, which could result in 
a lower educational gradient than in the rest of the region (Brzozowska 2015). Hun-
gary implemented policies in the early 1990s that encouraged women to leave their 
employment in order to relieve the labor market (Brzozowska 2015; David 1999). 
These policies suggest that highly educated women could have fewer children over-
all and a high level of childlessness, discouraged by the difficulty of reconciling a 
career with childrearing.
Data and Methods
In our study, we compare fertility intentions reported by 20- to 24-year-old women 
born between 1965 and 1979 (with the majority born between 1970 and 1975) to 
completed fertility at age 40 in the same birth cohorts. For the education-specific 
analysis, we focus on the 25 to 29 age range because most will have completed 
their education (see Table 2 for age at completion of full-time education). At this 
age, women still have a relatively long timeline to fulfill their reproductive plans, 
although in some subgroups (especially among the less educated) a large propor-
tion of women have initiated childbearing in their early 20s, and could already 
have reached their completed fertility (Rendall et al. 2010; Rendall and Smallwood 
2003).5 In a sensitivity analysis, we found that the country ordering for the fertility 
gaps were consistent for the 20 to 24 and 25 to 29 age groups, so the patterns were 
not very sensitive to the specific age range. We could not disaggregate by education, 
given that fertility data by level of education are not yet available for these later birth 
cohorts.
The Fertility and Family Surveys (FFSs) were our main data source on fertility 
intentions. Table 3 provides the survey characteristics (for more details, see Prioux 
and Festy 2002). The FFS were conducted during the 1990s under the leadership of 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. The exact cohorts studied 
depended on the survey year. In most countries, these surveys cover men and women 
between ages 20 and 49, interviewed face to face. Compared to the Eurobarometer 
surveys, which also contain questions on lifetime intentions, the large sample sizes 
are a clear advantage of the FFS. Another advantage is that—unlike its successor, 
the Generations and Gender Surveys—lifetime intentions questions are identical 
5 Although birth schedules are influenced by the duration of education (i.e., childbearing is generally 
postponed until education is completed), there is little evidence so far that the length of education itself 
substantially affects completed fertility and childlessness (Monstad et  al. 2008; Skirbekk et  al. 2004). 
Events that take place after the end of the studies (in particular related to partnership and employment) 
seem much more likely to be responsible for further postponement and lead, in consequence, to a lower 
number of children.
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across country questionnaires (Beaujouan 2013). In the FFS, the question wording 
was “(In addition to the child you are now expecting [pregnant]) do you want to 
have (children of your own [childless]) (another child [parous]) some time? Yes, no, 
don’t know,” followed for those who indicated yes by the question, “(In addition 
to the child you are now expecting [pregnant]) how many (children of your own 
[childless]) (more children [parous]) do you want?” The share of ‘don’t know/miss-
ing’ answers to the first question is provided in Table 3; a distinction between ‘don’t 
know’ and missing for other reasons was not possible to know in several surveys. 
For that reason, we could not assess the link between the prevalence of uncertainty 
and the size of the gap. If in the first question women responded that they wanted a 
child, but did not give a number in the second question (this concerned between 0 
and 4%; Bulgaria was distinct because 13% were missing), we imputed the number 
of children intended based on valid cases in the country, controlling for age, parity, 
marital status, and level of education.6 For two countries we used different datasets: 
for The Netherlands, we used the Onderzoek Gezinsvorming (OG, Survey of Family 
Formation) data of 1998 (de Graaf and van Duin 2007), and for the UK, the CPC 
General Household Survey (GHS) time series of 1989–1990 (Beaujouan et al. 2011, 
2014, 2015), which contain relatively comparable questions on fertility intentions 
and identical response categories (yes, no, don’t know).7
In order to compare the lifetime fertility intentions of women aged 20 to 24 with 
the completed number of children, we used fertility estimates at the end of the repro-
ductive life for the same (or approximatively the same) cohorts. Completed cohort 
fertility and childlessness levels were either reconstructed from the Human Fertility 
Database (Human Fertility Database 2016; Jasilioniene et  al. 2007), from data by 
national statistical offices, or provided by Tomáš Sobotka (Sobotka 2017; Sobotka 
et al. 2015) (for further details see Table 4). Unfortunately, cohort childlessness was 
not available for Portugal, so this country can only be included in the analysis of 
completed fertility but not of childlessness. All analyses were restricted to women 
because completed cohort fertility was mostly unavailable for men.
The substantial sample sizes of the FFS (more than 500 women 25 to 29 years 
old in most surveys) enabled us to categorize observations into three different 
educational groups (see Table 4 for sample sizes and data sources). We excluded 
Lithuania because the education categories could not be reconciled with the 
ISCED classification. Data for completed fertility and cohort total childless-
ness by level of education were not available in a few other countries. Data on 
6 This way, we avoided an underestimation of the number of children intended due to the exclusion of 
women with positive intentions but missing information on the number. Possibly, women with missing 
information on this item intend a lower number of children than those with valid information. If this is 
the case, the imputation can bias estimates of the intended number of children very slightly upwards.
7 In OG, “Do you still expect (more [parous]) children in the future (other than this child [pregnant])?” 
Yes, don’t know, no; If “Yes” or “Don’t know”, “How many children do you expect at least? And how 
many at most?”. In the GHS, “Do you think that you will have any (more [parous]) children at all (after 
the one you are expecting [pregnant])?” Yes, no, don’t know; If “Yes” or “Don’t know”, “How many chil-
dren do you think you will have born to you in all (including those you have already [parous]) (who are 
still alive) (and the one you are expecting [pregnant])?”.
 E. Beaujouan, C. Berghammer 
1 3
Ta
bl
e 
3 
 M
ain
 ch
ar
ac
ter
ist
ics
 of
 th
e F
er
til
ity
 an
d F
am
ily
 S
ur
ve
ys
Co
un
tri
es
Su
rv
ey
 ye
ar
s
Or
ig
in
al 
sa
m
pl
e 
siz
e (
wo
m
en
)
Su
rv
ey
 no
n-
re
sp
on
se
 
ra
te 
(w
om
en
)
Pr
op
or
tio
n m
iss
in
g/
do
n’t
 
kn
ow
 fe
rti
lit
y  i
nt
en
tio
ns
f
Co
ho
rts
 su
rv
ey
ed
 at
 
ag
e 2
0–
24
Fi
na
l s
am
pl
e s
ize
, w
om
en
 
ag
e 2
0–
24
 at
 ti
m
e o
f s
ur
ve
y
Au
str
ia
19
95
–1
99
6
45
81
33
/1
8a
7
19
71
–1
97
6
67
5
Be
lg
iu
m
19
91
–1
99
2
32
36
30
5e
19
67
–1
97
2
59
9
Bu
lg
ar
ia
19
97
–1
99
8
23
67
9b
21
19
73
–1
97
8
30
6
Cz
ec
h R
ep
ub
lic
19
97
17
35
7b
17
19
73
–1
97
7
26
6
Es
to
ni
a
19
94
50
21
15
1
19
70
–1
97
4
29
9
Fr
an
ce
19
94
29
44
16
8
19
70
–1
97
4
45
0
Ge
rm
an
y
19
92
59
76
24
/2
9c
27
19
68
–1
97
2
10
41
Gr
ee
ce
19
99
30
31
84
d
6
19
75
–1
97
9
49
6
Hu
ng
ar
y
19
92
–1
99
3
35
54
12
14
19
68
–1
97
3
67
8
Ita
ly
19
95
–1
99
6
48
24
42
10
19
71
–1
97
6
84
0
La
tv
ia
19
95
26
99
23
26
19
71
–1
97
5
34
7
Li
th
ua
ni
a
19
94
–1
99
5
45
16
29
21
19
70
–1
97
5
40
6
Th
e  N
eth
er
lan
ds
g
19
93
45
16
10
6
19
69
–1
97
3
76
3
No
rw
ay
19
88
–1
98
9
40
19
19
22
19
64
–1
96
9
60
5
Po
rtu
ga
l
19
97
59
54
5
9
19
73
–1
97
7
91
1
Sl
ov
en
ia
19
94
–1
99
5
27
98
14
b
13
19
70
–1
97
5
33
3
Sp
ain
19
94
–1
99
5
40
21
16
14
19
70
–1
97
6
62
4
Sw
itz
er
lan
d
19
94
–1
99
5
38
78
62
d
17
19
70
–1
97
7
30
4
UK
h
19
89
–1
99
0
14
,00
4
n.a
.
9
19
65
–1
96
9
12
15
US
19
95
10
,84
7
n.a
.
12
19
71
–1
97
5
14
16
1 3
The Gap Between Lifetime Fertility Intentions and Completed…
a  N
on
-re
sp
on
se
 ra
te 
of
 m
en
 an
d w
om
en
 w
as
 33
% 
in
 V
ien
na
 an
d 1
8%
 in
 th
e r
es
t o
f A
us
tri
a
b  M
en
 an
d w
om
en
c  E
as
t a
nd
 W
es
t G
er
m
an
y
d  T
he
 re
sp
on
se
 ra
tes
 in
 G
re
ec
e 
an
d 
Sw
itz
er
lan
d 
ar
e 
ba
se
d 
on
 a
 d
iff
er
en
t c
alc
ul
ati
on
 a
nd
 p
ro
ba
bl
y 
ov
er
es
tim
ate
d. 
Th
eir
 st
ati
sti
ca
l o
ffi
ce
s s
ug
ge
st 
th
at,
 a
fte
r w
eig
ht
in
g, 
th
e 
re
pr
es
en
tat
ive
ne
ss
 of
 th
e s
am
pl
es
 re
m
ain
s r
ea
so
na
bl
e (
Pr
io
ux
 an
d F
es
ty
 20
02
)
e  In
 B
elg
iu
m
, t
he
 p
ro
po
rti
on
 in
ten
di
ng
 to
 re
m
ain
 c
hi
ld
les
s w
as
 v
er
y 
hi
gh
 a
t a
ge
 2
0–
24
 (1
7%
) f
or
 a
n 
un
kn
ow
n 
re
as
on
. W
e 
de
cid
ed
 n
ot
 to
 d
isp
lay
 th
e 
re
su
lts
 fo
r t
hi
s a
ge
 
gr
ou
p, 
bu
t d
isp
lay
 th
em
 by
 le
ve
l o
f e
du
ca
tio
n f
or
 th
e 2
5–
29
 ag
e g
ro
up
f  W
e 
ex
clu
de
d 
co
un
tri
es
 w
ith
 v
er
y 
hi
gh
 sh
ar
es
 o
f m
iss
in
g 
va
lu
es
 a
nd
/o
r d
on
’t 
kn
ow
 a
ns
we
rs 
(m
or
e 
th
an
 3
0%
), 
na
m
ely
 C
an
ad
a, 
Fi
nl
an
d, 
an
d 
Ne
w 
Ze
ala
nd
, b
ec
au
se
 su
ch
 
hi
gh
 le
ve
ls 
co
ul
d 
re
fle
ct 
a s
tru
ctu
ra
l p
ro
bl
em
 in
 th
e s
ur
ve
y 
(e
.g.
, s
om
e r
es
po
nd
en
ts 
we
re
 n
ot
 as
ke
d 
th
e q
ue
sti
on
). 
In
 P
ol
an
d, 
th
e p
ro
po
rti
on
 m
iss
in
g 
at 
ag
e 2
0–
24
 w
as
 p
ar-
tic
ul
ar
ly
 hi
gh
 (3
7%
) a
s w
as
 th
e s
ha
re
 of
 m
iss
in
g v
alu
es
 on
 nu
m
be
r i
nt
en
de
d w
he
n a
ns
we
rin
g y
es
 (2
2%
) s
o P
ol
an
d w
as
 ex
clu
de
d a
s w
ell
g  O
nd
er
zo
ek
 G
ez
in
sv
or
m
in
g
h  C
PC
 G
en
er
al 
Ho
us
eh
ol
d S
ur
ve
y t
im
e s
er
ies
Ta
bl
e 
2 
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
 E. Beaujouan, C. Berghammer 
1 3
final parity were either provided in the Cohort Fertility and Education Database 
(Zeman et  al. 2014), or recalculated based on the Generations and Gender Sur-
veys that took place in the early 2000s. We used the common classification of 
educational levels into low (ISCED 0–2; up to lower secondary), medium (ISCED 
3–4; upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary), and high (ISCED 5–6; 
tertiary). Since information on the level of education pertains to the time of the 
interview, we had to make the assumption that, in the cohorts studied, education 
was stable over time, from their mid- to late 20s.
Our analytical approach is as follows: we undertake a side-by-side comparison 
of different countries for which we provide information on the macro-context, with-
out testing contextual variables in macro-level models. This approach is widely 
used, but mostly—although not exclusively—for a smaller number of countries (Yu 
2015). We settled on this approach because of the lack of contextual data and infor-
mation on the years of giving birth for a time span of around 20 years (from young 
adulthood to the early 40s) and for 20 countries: too many data points were missing 
to estimate macro-level models.
Our research design has several limitations. First, an aggregate approach naturally 
precludes any statements about the realization of intentions on an individual level. 
Because we do not follow individuals over time, we cannot know the extent to which 
women over- or under-achieve their fertility intentions and how this differs across 
countries. Second, it may be considered a drawback that the cohort fertility gap is 
only measured after a cohort has completed its fertility (that is, after an approxi-
mately 20-year period of childbearing), incurring a long lead time. This is different 
from period measures which are available for recent periods. Third, some research-
ers have critically noted that lifetime fertility intentions are difficult to measure. 
Respondents do not necessarily have an attitude formed at the time of the interview 
Table 4  Sample sizes by education and data sources for completed fertility by level of education
Countries Final sample size, women 
age 25–29 at time of 
survey, by education
Data source for completed fertility by level of education
Low Medium High
Austria 211 420 155 Microcensus 2012
Belgium 186 339 359 Extrapolation 2001 census
Czech Republic 137 141 34 Census 2011
Germany 356 831 292 Microcensus 2012
UK 981 267 133 GHS + Understanding Society 2009
Hungary 323 265 112 Census 2011
Italy 304 477 96 Famiglia e Sogetti Sociali 2009
The Netherlands 269 431 161 Onderzoek Gezinsvorming 2008
Norway 89 212 415 Generations and Gender Survey 2007–2008
Spain 394 153 164 Census 2011
Switzerland 64 498 97 Swiss Household Panel 2013
US 325 571 843 Current Population Survey 2008/2010/2012
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(Bachrach and Morgan 2013) and possibly make up whether they want children or 
not, as well as how many, because of the coercive nature of the interview situation 
and possibly influenced by social norms and desirability (Ní Bhrolcháin and Beaujo-
uan 2019). Fourth, it is a general concern in cross-national research that deviations 
in question wording, differences in survey protocols (e.g., representativeness of the 
samples), and in survey quality (e.g., high non-response rates) may affect the results 
(Beaujouan 2013).
Results
We first show the findings for the fertility gap and for excess childlessness across 
countries and then analyze fertility gap and excess childlessness by education. 
Figure 1 depicts the mean intended family size between ages 20 and 24, the com-
pleted cohort fertility rate at age 40 in the equivalent birth cohorts and the differ-
ence between both measures. The difference is negative for all countries, because 
completed fertility was always below the mean intended family size measured in 
young adulthood. A distinct cluster appears for the Southern European countries, 
where the size of the fertility gap is largest (slightly less so in Portugal). This 
is driven by a combination of relatively high fertility intentions at younger ages 
and below-average mean numbers of children. In Central and Eastern Europe, we 
Fig. 1  Mean intended family size at age 20–24, completed cohort fertility rate at age 40–42, and fer-
tility gap. Sources for intentions: Fertility and Family Surveys, Onderzoek Gezinsvorming, CPC Gen-
eral Household Survey time series; for cohort total fertility: Human Fertility Database, national statisti-
cal offices or provided by Tomáš Sobotka. Interpretation: in Austria, women born in the early 1970s 
intended to have 1.95 children but only had 1.67 on average. Actual family size was thus lower than 
intended family size by 0.28 children on average, so the size of the gap was 0.28 children per woman
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find a larger gap in countries with a poorer economic situation, particularly in the 
Baltic States but, deviating from this rule, also in Slovenia. The Czech Republic 
and Hungary, on the other hand, display a smaller fertility gap. As expected, Aus-
tria and Germany, where both intentions and completed fertility are low, display 
moderate fertility gaps. Conversely, in Switzerland, intentions are much higher 
than expected based on the low fertility of the previous cohorts, and consequently 
the gap is very wide. In the other Western countries, the largest gaps are observed 
in The Netherlands and Norway, which are among the countries with the highest 
mean intended family size (resp. 2.32 and 2.46). The size of the gap is explained 
by high levels of intentions rather than by low fertility levels. The gap is rela-
tively small in the UK, the US, and France.
Excess childlessness clearly differs between European regions (Fig. 2). In par-
ticular, childlessness intentions are almost non-existent in the Central and Eastern 
European countries and a low level of around 10–12% of women have remained 
childless, so excess childlessness is below 11 percentage points (again, except for 
in Slovenia where childlessness reaches almost 15%). Intentions are also quite 
low in France, Norway, and the US and less than 15% of women remain child-
less, hence their balance is the closest to the Central and Eastern European coun-
tries. At the other end of the spectrum, despite a low preference for staying child-
less, a significant share of women in Spain and Italy will eventually not have any 
Fig. 2  Share of women intending not to have children at age 20–24, share not having children at age 
40–42, and excess childlessness. Sources like in Fig.  1; in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Greece 
levels of childlessness were extrapolated based on the existing data. Interpretation: in Austria, 5.8% of 
women born in the early 1970s intended to remain childless, but on average 19.9% remained childless. 
The share of women eventually childless was thus larger than the share originally intending not to have 
children, exceeding it by 14.1 percentage points
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children (around 22%), resulting in the largest excess childlessness in Europe 
(around 20 percentage points). Other Western European countries display both 
higher childlessness intentions and high rates of childlessness—typically around 
20%—so that the discrepancy is between 12 and 14 percentage points.
Having discussed family size and childlessness for all women, we now turn 
to education-specific findings. Figure 3 compares the intended and actual mean 
number of children by level of education. Intended family size between ages 25 
and 29 is higher than completed fertility after age 40 in all analyzed countries and 
education groups. There is no consistent educational gradient in mean intended 
family size, although for most countries it is either U-shaped or negative. How-
ever, the educational gradient in completed fertility is clearly negative, and highly 
educated women generally show the largest gap between intended and realized 
fertility. The educational gradient is, however, small in several countries: the gap 
amounts to around 0.6–0.7 children per woman in all educational groups in Italy, 
around 0.4–0.5 in The Netherlands and the US, and is lower than 0.3 in the Czech 
Republic, Norway, Germany, and Austria. This is either due to similarly large 
gradients in intentions and fertility (e.g., in the US) or to small gradients in both 
(e.g., in Norway). By contrast, the difference between low and highly educated 
Fig. 3  Mean intended family size at age 25–29, completed cohort fertility rate at age 40–42, and fertility 
gap by level of education. Sources like in Fig. 1
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women in the intentions-fertility gap is by far largest in Spain and Switzerland 
(around 0.6 children per woman, with the gap amounting to 0.9 children among 
highly educated women, and to 0.3 children among the less educated) and in both 
countries the gap is driven by the steep educational gradient in completed fertility 
while fertility intentions by educational attainment are less varied. Overall, the 
size of the educational gradient in the gap between intended and realized fertil-
ity across countries shows contrasting patterns, which do not seem to depend on 
economic criteria or regional specificity. This is both because of the variability in 
educational differences in intentions and the very diverse completed fertility gra-
dients within regions with similar characteristics.
Finally, Fig.  4 summarizes the results for childlessness by level of education. 
Unlike mean family size, which did not show a regional pattern, the Southern 
European and the German-speaking countries clearly exhibit the largest difference 
in excess childlessness between low and highly educated women. The two Central 
and Eastern European countries (Czech Republic and Hungary), as well as Norway 
and Belgium, display almost no educational gradient in excess childlessness, having 
rather uniform intentions and actual levels by educational attainment. In the coun-
tries that exhibit a large gradient, it is almost entirely driven by the strong educa-
tional differences in actual childlessness. And clearly, with the exception of Central 
and Eastern Europe, this gradient is the highest in countries where reconciling a 
career with children is most difficult, i.e., in Spain and Italy and the German-speak-
ing countries.
Fig. 4  Share of women intending not to have children at age 25–29, share not having children at age 
40–42, and excess childlessness by level of education. Sources like in Fig. 1
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Concluding Discussion
Our exploration of the aggregate gap between fertility and childlessness inten-
tions in young adulthood and completed family size and final childlessness in the 
same birth cohorts brings new insights to the discussion on the “fertility gap.” 
Inspired by Bachrach and Morgan’s approach (2013), we took the perspective 
that intentions at young ages were defined by societal fertility norms and family 
context, and that institutional conditions in peak childbearing years have a large 
impact on the capacity to meet fertility goals. Our comparative approach allowed 
us to suggest explanations to why the size of the fertility gap differs across coun-
tries and educational groups.
Our results reveal quite distinctive regional patterns for women born (mostly) 
in the early 1970s. We observe the largest fertility gaps in the Southern European 
countries (more than 0.6 children per woman in Italy, Greece, and Spain). This is in 
line with our expectations: we anticipated low completed fertility in the South based 
on unstable labor market conditions and little support for reconciling work and fam-
ily life. In these countries, the fertility gap was boosted by the relatively high fertility 
intentions in young adulthood, certainly driven by traditionally large family sizes. 
For Central and Eastern European countries, we identified countervailing forces that 
might influence the fertility gap: poor economic situations and difficulty combining 
work and family (both being conducive to a small family size), partly counterbal-
anced by a high prevalence of unplanned births. The intended family size was rather 
low in that region (around two children per woman in most countries), correspond-
ing to relatively low fertility achieved in the parental cohort. Although we found 
rather small gaps in most Central and Eastern European countries, in line with our 
expectations, higher fertility gaps of 0.3–0.4 children per woman were displayed in 
the region’s weaker economies (particularly the Baltic States). Among the Western 
countries, in the UK, the US, and France, rather high fertility together with higher 
fertility intentions (in line with previous cohorts’ fertility levels) resulted in a small 
to medium gap. It may seem surprising that both France and the US have the small-
est gaps between mean intended and total fertility, because France has more devel-
oped and generous family policies than the US (Crittenden 2001). However, the high 
share of “overachievers” in the US (e.g., teenage mothers) may be responsible for 
this finding (Berrington and Pattaro 2014; Morgan and Rackin 2010; Quesnel-Vallée 
and Morgan 2003). In the German-speaking countries, we would have expected 
larger gaps because the support for work–family reconciliation is weak, but we 
found that this larger gap only applies to Switzerland. Indeed, Germany and Austria 
are among the countries with the lowest mean intended family sizes, in line with 
their long history of low fertility, which resulted in moderate gaps. Switzerland, 
however, had persistently high fertility intentions, despite its long-term low fertility.
How do these results compare to previous research? Studies on the UK and the 
US have indicated fertility gaps of a magnitude of 0.2–0.3 children per woman for 
slightly older cohorts than studied here (Morgan and Rackin 2010; Smallwood 
and Jefferies 2003). Comparing all the countries studied, these gaps are relatively 
moderate and, depending on the region, they may be significantly higher: fertility 
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gaps are, for instance, about twice as large in the Southern European countries. 
Based on the intended number of children and the tempo-adjusted total fertility 
rate, gaps of around 0.3–0.4 children per woman had been reported as a European 
average which closely correspond to the mean of all the countries we included 
(Sobotka and Lutz 2010). However, the regional pattern obtained with the tempo-
adjusted method clearly diverged from ours as moderate gaps were noted for 
Southern Europe and large gaps for Central and Eastern Europe (Sobotka and 
Lutz 2010).
In addition to the mean number of children, we presented evidence on childless-
ness. The assumption that both childlessness intentions and actual childlessness 
would be particularly low in the Central and Eastern European countries (resulting 
in a small gap) was confirmed by our results. Indeed, the cohorts under study grew 
up under state socialism (until their late teenage years), when there were very strong 
norms against voluntary childlessness and policies supporting early and almost uni-
versal entry into parenthood. In this context, women would have one child rather 
than none (Frejka and Gietel-Basten 2016; Merz and Liefbroer 2012; Sobotka 
2011).8 Very low childlessness levels continued long after the fall of communism 
(Beaujouan et al. 2016). Our results suggest that in the East, the strong negative atti-
tudes towards childlessness were more important for defining intentions and actual 
fertility than the economic situation or family policies. In addition, we identified two 
distinct country clusters that featured the largest excess childlessness of around 20%: 
the Southern European countries (Italy, Greece, and Spain) and the German-speak-
ing countries (particularly Germany and Austria). Excess childlessness was lower 
(above 10 percentage points) in the other Western countries, where it may have been 
mitigated by the well-established work–family policies.
The education-specific analyses refined some of our general results. In accord-
ance with prior research, we observed small differences in fertility and childlessness 
intentions by education, without a clear-cut pattern (Testa 2014). However, our anal-
ysis confirmed that highly educated women achieve a lower mean number of chil-
dren (except for in Belgium and Norway) and a higher level of childlessness (except 
for in the Czech Republic and Norway), which leads to a larger gap between inten-
tions and final parity than for their lower educated counterparts. Overall, the size of 
the educational gradient of the gap in mean family size did not seem predicted by 
economic criteria or welfare regimes. For instance, we had expected moderate edu-
cation-based gradients in Italy and Spain because childbearing of the low educated 
is curtailed by high economic insecurity, while childbearing of the highly educated 
is constrained especially by limited support for combining employment and fam-
ily. This seemed to apply only to Italy, whereas in Spain, the fertility gap was much 
larger for highly educated women. In the UK, we observed almost no fertility gap 
among less educated women, but a marked gap among their highly educated peers, 
which was in line with previous findings in the UK and the US (Berrington and Pat-
taro 2014; Morgan and Rackin 2010; Quesnel-Vallée and Morgan 2003). Unintended 
8 In addition, in face-to-face interviews, the answers on childlessness intentions may have been particu-
larly low because they partly reflected social desirability.
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fertility among the less educated women, linked to low contraceptive use and high 
rates of teenage pregnancies, could partly explain this result. We did not find that 
result for women in the US, but the differences with previous research in age group, 
birth cohort, and measurement may be behind this discordance.
Unlike for the mean number of children, the educational gradient for excess 
childlessness displayed a clear regional pattern: the gradient was the largest in 
countries where the combination of work and family is most difficult, namely the 
German-speaking countries and Southern Europe, as well as in The Netherlands 
and the UK where the majority of mothers work part-time. We had expected the 
smallest gradient in Norway given the well-established work–family policies and 
similar labor market outcomes between educational groups. This is confirmed by 
our data: the educational gradient in final childlessness is the lowest of all the 
countries studied together with Belgium. In contrast, in Hungary and the Czech 
Republic, childlessness levels were close to initial childlessness intentions, and 
particularly so among the medium educated.
What do our findings suggest in terms of policies? One of the clearest results 
is that highly educated women have the highest level of excess childlessness 
(18–26 percentage points) in the German-speaking (Austria, Germany, Switzer-
land) and the Southern European countries (Italy, Spain), where the obstacles for 
work–family reconciliation are highest. We could show that, despite highly edu-
cated women having moderately stronger preferences for work than their lower 
educated peers (Hakim 2002), they are not more likely to want to stay childless or 
to want fewer children than lower educated women. Still, fertility gap and excess 
childlessness are highest for them in almost all countries. The larger gaps among 
more highly educated women suggest that focusing policies on the needs of 
higher educated women to reconcile work and family demands are likely to have 
the biggest influence on birth rates. A series of measures have been suggested that 
aim to provide highly educated women with good conditions for having the num-
ber of children they want to have and a career simultaneously. This would include 
a well-developed childcare system when it comes to opening times and quality, 
a short to medium period of parental leave of up to 1  year with income-based 
payments available for all types of job, e.g., self-employed (Dearing 2016), and 
flexibility in terms of time and place to work. In addition, Esping-Andersen has 
argued that “a return to fertility levels that are more aligned with people’s prefer-
ences will require the consolidation of a new, ‘gender egalitarian’ family equilib-
rium” (Esping-Andersen 2017, p. 56). Highly educated couples generally display 
more gender egalitarian attitudes and are hence particularly inclined to respond 
to policies aimed at gender equality. Examples of such policies are reserving 
part of parental leave for fathers (Dearing 2016) and taking into account fathers’ 
care responsibilities in employment policies (e.g., flexibility, schedules that can 
be planned ahead, reducing overtime). In conclusion, if societies want to raise 
their birth rates, one pathway would be to enable highly educated women to have 
the children they intend to by fostering the combination of work–family for both 
mothers and fathers. An increase in fertility in gender egalitarian societies could 
thus be spearheaded by highly educated women (Esping-Andersen and Billari 
2015).
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